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A BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH TO THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS: SCALOGRAM
ANALYSIS
by StoNEY RAYMOND PECKV
During the past decade, certain social scientists, known as judicial
behaviouralists, have examined and attempted to explain the role of
the courts in the development and administration of public law in
the United States. Although they have developed several different
approaches to the study of the judicial process,1 the judicial behaviouralists share certain characteristics which allow them to be
identified as a school of thought.
They all look upon the administration of public law by the court
as an aspect of political behaviour, in continuous interaction with
other political institutions and forces; and, accordingly, they regard
judges as policy-makers. They bring to the study of the court the
theories and techniques of one or more of the social sciences, particularly, political theory, economics and social psychology, and focus
upon the behaviour of individual judges and other participants in the
judicial process. They use theories of statistics and statistical methods
of data processing, and so are able to study much larger samples of
the relevant data than was possible for earlier students of the judicial
process.
To place the development of judicial behaviouralism in historical
context, we must bear in mind that the legal realists, who wrote in
the 1920s and 1930s, brought about a change in the ways in which
American judges, academics and practitioners view the nature and
function of the law and of the judicial process. For the past quartercentury, members of the three branches of the profession in the
United States have understood the law as a social institution whose
*Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto.
1 G. A. Schubert has identified four. See Schubert, Glendon A., BibliographicaZ Essay: Behavioral Research in Public Law, (1963) 57 Am. POL. Sc.
Rnv. 433; SCHEMRT, GLENDON A., THE PoLrrIcAL ROLE OF TE COURTs, (New
York: Scott Foresman, 1965), 104-130. See also A Symposium: Social Science
Approaches to the JudicialProcess, (1966) 78 HARv. L. REv. 1551.
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development both affects and is affected by changes in other social
institutions. They have generally recognized that judges have substantial freedom in the application of precedent and statute; that, in
at least some cases, judges make new law and do not simply apply
old law; that, at least to some extent, judicial decisions are the product
of the judge as a whole man, not as a trained professional; and that,
if judicial decision-making is to meet the needs of a changing society,
it must be based on principle and policy rather than doctrine and
precedent.
The judicial behaviouralists, in emphasizing the function of judges
as policy-makers in the political (that is, governing) process, build
upon the foundations laid by the legal realists. Although their
approach is new in technique and design, and has had a mixed reception, it is within the spirit of the jurisprudential tradition.
How will judicial behaviouralism be received in Canada? Canadian
jurisprudence clearly bears the stamp of English positivism, modified
to some degree by the influence of American legal realism and an
early indigenous legal realism. 2 These moderating influences are
perhaps still more strongly felt by members of the law school faculties
than by members of the Bar and Bench. The state of Canadian jurisprudence suggests that judicial behaviouralism will, at least initially,
be less at home in this country than in the United States. Despite that
possibility, it is clear that Canadian lawyers will want to acquaint
themselves with new approaches to the institutions around which
their professional lives are centred.
In this paper I outline generally and briefly the four approaches
taken by the judicial behaviouralists; I discuss the theory and method
of Guttman cumulative scaling; I examine the work of three behaviouralists who have applied cumulative scaling to the judicial
process; I offer a critique; and, finally, I discuss the applicability of
the method to the work of Canadian courts.
Judicial Behaviouralism: Four Approaches
Those behaviouralists who take what Schubert calls the "group
interaction approach" to the study of the courts, argue that to understand the role played by courts in social and political processes, we
must not regard judges as an isolated group whose activities can best
be explained by a critical study of the reasons which they give to support their judgments. Instead, they say, we must investigate how
judges are appointed and promoted, how interest groups attempt to
influence the development of the law through litigation, what knowledge members of the community have about judges and their judgments, and what effect judgments have on the community. Students
pursuing this approach investigate how consumer pressure groups, 3
2 McWhinney, Edward, English Legal Philosophy and Canadian Legal
Philosophy, (1957-58) 4 McGILL L.J. 213..
3 Vose, Clement E., The National Consumers' League and the Brandeis
Brief, (1957) 1 MmW. J. PoL Sci. 267. In footnotes 3 to 14, I list a selection
of recent publications representative of the research of four groups of behaviouralists. Most of the works cited are discussed by Schubert In the pieces
cited in footnote 1, supra, to which reference may be made for a more complete bibliography.
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business pressure groups 4 and special interest groups5 participate
in test cases and other litigation in an effort to obtain judicial pro-

tection of the claims put forward by their members, and the extent

to which such decisions as the school desegregation cases 6 and the

released time for religious education cases7 have been effective in

practice.
The proponents of the "small group approach ' 8 make empirical
studies of the Supreme Court of the United States, which analyse
the dynamics of its functioning as a small group. The emphasis is on
the identification and characterization of blocs of judges based on
voting records; 9 studies of the types of leadership or power exercised
by the Chief Justice and other judges, particularly the importance of
the power to assign the writing of judgments; 0 studies of the relationship between the judges and their "law clerks";" and analysis of
12
judicial behaviour on the basis of game theory.
A third behavioural approach is the study of the political socialization of judges. This involves a description of the social background
of the justices of the United States Supreme Court, and an attempt
to discover what relationships, if any, exist between their background
characteristics and their decision-making behaviour.13 Researchers
1

4 Hakman, Nathan,
WEST. Bus. REV. 124.

Business Influence in the Judicial Process, (1957)

5 VOSE, CLEMENT E., CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE
N.A.A.C.P. AND THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES, (Berkeley and Los Angeles,
Univ. of Calif. Press, 1959).
6 Patric, Gordon, The Impact of a Court Decision: Aftermath of the
McCollum Case, (1957) 6 J. PuB. L. 455; Sorauf, Frank J., Zorach v. Clausson;

The Impact of a Supreme Court Decision, (1959) 53 Am. POL. SCI. REV. 777;

Vines, Kenneth N., FederalDistrict Judges and Race Relations Cases in the
South, (1964) 26 J. POL. 337; Vines, Kenneth N., Southern States Supreme
Courts and Race Relations, (1965) 18 WEST. POL. Q. 5.
7 PELTASON,

JACK W., FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN, (New York: Harcourt,

Brace & World, 1961).
8 Murphy, Walter F., Courts as Small Groups, (1966) 79 HARV. L. REV. 1565.
9 Snyder, Eloise C., The Supreme Court as a Small Group, (1958) 33
SOCIAL FORCES 232; Ulmer, S. Sidney, The Analysis of Behavior Patterns in
tlze United States Supreme Court, (1960) 22 J. POL. 633; Ulmer, S. Sidney,
Toward a Theory of Subgroup Formationin the United States Supreme Court,
(1965) 27 J. POL. 133; SCHUBERT, GLENDON A., QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959) 77-172; Loeb, L. S., Judicial Blocs
and JudicialValues in Civil Liberty Cases, (1965) 14 Am. Uxiv. L. REV. 146.
10 Danelski, David J., The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decision
Process of the Supreme Court, in MURPHY, WALTER F., AND PRITCHETT, C.
HERMAN, COURTS, JUDGES AND POLITICS, (New York: Random House, 1961)
497-508; Ulmer, S. Sidney, Homeostatic Tendencies in the United States Supreme Court, in ULMER, S. SIDNEY, INTRODUCTORY READINGS IN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1961), 174; Ulmer, S. Sidney, Leadership in
the Michigan Supreme Court, in SCHUBERT, GLENDON A., JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING, (Glencoe: Free Press, 1963), 13-28. Ulmer S. Sidney, The Analysis
of Behavior Patterns on the United States Supreme Court, (1960) 22 J. POL.
629, at 640-647.
1 Newland, Chester, Personal Assistants to Supreme Court Justices: The
Law Clerks, (1961) 40 ORE. L. REV. 299.
12 See SCHUBERT, QUANTITATm ANALYSIS, supra, footnote 9, at 173-267;

Schubert, Glendon A., Policy Without Law: An Extension of the Certiorari
Game, (1962) 14 STAN. L. REV. 284.
13 See for example, Schmidhauser, John R., The Justices of the Supreme
Court: A Collective Portrait, (1959) 3 MIDW. J. POL. SCI. 1; Schmidhauser,
John R., Stare Decisis, Dissent and the Background of the Justices of the
(Footnote continued on next page]
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single out as influential characteristics, socio-economic, religious,
ethnic, political and educational background and the professional
interests of the judges prior to appointment.
Another group of behaviouralists uses the theories and methods of
attitudinal analysis, developed by social psychologists, to study
judicial attitudes. The research attempts to identify judges' attitudes
toward public policy issues, and to demonstrate the relationship
between those attitudes and judicial decision-making behaviour. This
research uses both factor analysis 14 and Guttman cumulative scaling' 5
to measure and analyse judicial attitudes. The application of Guttman
scaling techniques to cases decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States has been carried on primarily by Glendon Schubert,
Harold Spaeth and Sidney Ulmer. They claim to have demonstrated
that the decisions of the Supreme Court Judges in the majority of
cases are governed by their attitudes to civil liberties and to economic
policy.
16
Guttman Cumulative Scalograms
The Guttman cumulative scale 17 is a technique developed by
social psychologists to measure the attitude of subjects toward social
objects, and to locate the subjects on an attitudinal dimension or
continuum. An attitude has been defined as an enduring syndrome
18
of response consistency with regard to a set of social objects.

Supreme Court of the United States, (1962) 14 U. TORONTO L.J. 194; Ulmer,
S. Sidney, Public Office in the Social Background of Supreme Court Justices,
(1962) 21 Am. J. EcoN. Soc. 57; Ulmer, S. Sidney, The PoliticalParty Variable
in the Michigan Supreme Court, (1962) 11 J. PUB. L. 352; Torgerson, Ulf,
The Role of the Supreme Court in the Norwegian Political System, in

(ed.), JUDICIAL DECISiON- MAING, supra, footnote 10 at 221-224;
Nagel, Stuart S., Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, (1961) 55
Am. PoL. Sci. REV. 843; Nagel, Stuart S., Off-The-Bench Judicial Attitudes, in
SCEBERT (ed.), JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING, supra, at 29-53; Nagel, Stuart S.,
Ethnic Affiliations and Judicial Propensities, (1962) 24 J. POL. 92; Grossman,
Joel B., Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decision-Making, (1966) 79 HAMV. L.
REv. 1551.
14 See Guilford, J.R., Factorial Angles in Psychology, (1961) 68 PSYCH.
SCHBmERT

REv. 1; THuRSTONE, LouiS L., Ta

MVIEASURENMNT OF VALUES, (Chicago: Univ.

of Chicago Press, 1959); Thurstone, Louis L., and Degan, J. W., A Factorial
Study of the Supreme Court, (1951) PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES 628.

15 See references, infra.

16 In this section and the section which follows, I discuss the views held
by the behaviouralists and the conclusions they draw from their studies.
I postpone assessment of their views and conclusions until the section entitled
Critique.
17 Guttman, Louis L., in STOUFFER, S., STUDIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN

WORL WAR 1", VOL. 4, MEASUREMENT AND PREDICTION, (1950), c. 2-9; Guttman,
Louis L., The Principal Components of Scalable Attitudes and A New Approach to Factor Analysis: The Radex, in LAZARsFELD, P. F., (ed.), MATHE-

MATICAL

THINKING IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

(1954), 216-348; Green, B. F.,

Attitude Measurement in LINDZEY, G., (ed.), HANDBOOK oF SociAL PSYCHOLOGY,
(1954) Vol. 1, 335-369; TORGERSON, W. S., THEORY AND METHODS OF SCALING,
(1958) 298-359; SCHUBERT, GLENDON A., QUANTITATiVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR, supra, footnote 9, 269-270, 273-276; SCHUBERT, GLENDON A., THE
JUDICIAL IIND, (1965), 29-37, 75-83.

18 Green, B. F., Attitude Measurement, supra,footnote 17, 336.
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Like many psychological variables, attitude is a hypothetical or latent
variable, rather than an immediate observable variable. The concept of
attitude does not refer to any one specific act or response of an individual,
but is an abstraction from a large number of related acts or responses.
For example, when we state that individual A has a less favourable
attitude toward labour organizations than individual B, we mean that
A's many different statements and actions concerning labour organizations are consistently less favourable to labour than are B's comparable
words and deeds. We are justified in using a comprehensive concept like
attitude when the many related responses are consistent. That is, if
people who disapprove of the closed shop are also likely to want to outlaw
strikes, and to oppose minimum19wage laws, then it seems reasonable
to speak of an anti-labour attitude.
Social psychologists have attempted to measure attitudes by
eliciting the verbal responses of subjects to questions or statements
which relate to a given social object. 20 For example, to measure
attitudes toward foreigners, subjects might be asked to respond to
the following series of statements:
I am willing to accept foreigners
1. as visitors to my country;
2. as citizens of my country;
3. as members of my trade;
4. as neighbours;
5. as personal friends;
6. as relatives by marriage. 2 1
Individual subjects may indicate that they are willing to admit
foreigners to a certain degree of social relationship, but that they will
exclude them from any closer relationship. If we assign to each subject,
as his score, the number of the last statement to which he assents,
indicating the closest relationship to which he is willing to admit
foreigners, we are able to compare with one another the attitude of
each subject. A subject with a score of 6 has a more favourable
attitude toward foreigners than one whose score is 2. In this way
we are able to measure the attitudes of individuals and to locate each
on an attitudinal continuum or dimension.
The statements are cumulative in the sense that each one
represents a more favourable attitude than the one which precedes
it. Accordingly, it is expected that each subject who responds affirmatively to any statement will respond affirmatively to all statements
which precede it, and each subject who responds negatively to any
statement will respond negatively to all statements which follow it.
Responses which meet these conditions are said to be consistent; those
which do not are said to be inconsistent.
A subject might respond affirmatively to statements 1, 2, 3, 5
and 6, but negatively to statement 4. That the response to number 4
is inconsistent, may indicate that it is based on an attitude other than
19 Ihi., 335. For a general discussion of attitudes in the theory of social
psychology see NEwcomn, T. M., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE STUDY OF HUMAN

INTERAcTioi, (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 1965), 1-153.
20 NEwcom, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra, footnote 19, 496-534; Green, B. F.,

supra, footnote 17, especially 344-365.
1 This example is adapted from a scale devised by E. S. Bogardus, one
of the first social psychologists to use cumulative scaling. See NhwcomB, T. M.,
supra,footnote 19, 498-499.

[VOL. 5

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

the one under investigation; for example, it may be based on the
subject's attitude toward expected changes in property values. This
indicates that statement 4 relates to the latter additional dimension,
rather than to the one under investigation.
We may use the series of statements as a measure of subjects'
attitudes toward foreigners only if the statements relate to that
attitudinal dimension and to no other, so that the responses are based
on or determined by that attitude; that is, only if the statements are
undimensional. Where no inconsistencies occur in the responses, it is
likely that all the statements relate to the attitude being investigated,
and that the responses are made on the basis of that attitude. However,
when inconsistencies occur, it is necessary to devise a test to determine
whether all or most of the statements relate to the attitudinal
dimension under investigation.
Louis L. Guttman devised a scale which, he suggested, establishes
the unidimensionality of the statements contained on it. In constructing a Guttman cumulative scale, a researcher chooses questions or
statements which he believes to be samples of the whole range of
questions which relate to the attitudinal dimension under investigation, and which he believes to be distributed over the entire range of
that dimension. The Guttman cumulative scale is a tabulation of the
subjects' responses to those statements or questions.
We may construct a Guttman scale if we assume that five subjects
A, B, C, D and E respond to the six statements about foreigners as
indicated below. (An affirmative response is designated by a plus sign,
and a negative response by a minus sign.)

Statement

A

B

C

D

E

1

+

+

-

-

-

2

+

+

+

+

-

3

+

±

-

-

4

-+

5
6

+

+

-

-

-

+

+

-

-

-

-

.

.

.

.

It is apparent that A's attitude toward foreigners is relatively favourable, and E's unfavourable. The attitudes of C and D fall between the
two extremes represented by A and E. The only inconsistent response
is that of B to statement 4.
Where the statements on the scale are such that all subjects do,
in fact, respond consistently, the statements are said to be "scalable".
Scalability is taken as evidence that the statements are unidimensional,
that is, that the statements relate to a single attitudinal dimension,
and that the responses to them are determined by that attitude (in
the above example, the attitude to foreigners). Thus, it is said that
scalability evidences unidimensionality.
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However, in practice, a perfectly consistent scale occurs only

rarely. Guttman takes the position that as long as the number of
consistent responses constitutes more than ninety per cent of the
total number of responses, it is likely that the responses are largely
determined by a single dominant attitude, although secondary atti-

tudinal dimensions may be responsible for the inconsistencies. Thus,
Guttman is willing to accept as scalable, statements on a scale on which
at least ninety per cent of the responses are consistent. Such lessthan-perfect scalability evidences near-unidimensionality.
To measure the degree of consistency, Guttman developed a
formula for a "coefficient of reproducibility" (R), which indicates in
decimal form the percentage of consistency. 22 Herbert Menze123 developed a "coefficient of scalability" (S) which provides a more rigid
standard of scalability. If R is .90 or greater, and S is .60 or greater,
the array of statements is scalable, the statements are unidimensional,
and the responses are determined by a single dominant attitude. Such
an array of statements measures a single attitudinal dimension, and
so may be used to measure the intensity of the attitude in subjects,
and to locate the subjects along the attitudinal dimension.
Glendon Schubert has adapted the Guttman theory and method
24
of cumulative scaling for use in the analysis of judicial decisions,
22 R. is calculated by the formula

1-

number of inconsistent responses
(number of questions) x (number of respondents)

G. A. Schubert points out, in THE JUDicIAL MIND, supra, footnote 17, at 78,
that "one of the weaknesses of cumulative scaling, from a statistical point
of view, is the lack of any really uniform criterion of testing significance....
[Various rules of thumb have been conventionally associated with the use
of [the] coefficient." One of these is that the responses to any question on
the scale are not included in the calculation of R, if eighty per cent or more
of those responses are either affirmative or negative. If responses to questions
which elicit a nearly unanimous response were counted, the degree of consistency would be spuriously high because the closer the responses approach
unanimity, the less possibility there is that some responses will be inconsistent. See TORGERSON, supra, footnote 17, at 324; Green, B. P., supra, footnote
17, at 356; Lingoes, J. C., Multiple Scaogram Analysis: A Set-Theoretic
Model for Analyzing Dichotomous Items, (1963) 23 EDUCATIoNAL AND PsYcHoLOGICAL MTEASUREMENT, 504-510, cited in SCHUBERT, G. A., THE JUDICIAL MINm,
78. See also Spaeth, Harold J., Judicial Power as a Variable Motivating
Supreme Court Behavior, (1962) 6 MImW. J. POL. Sci. 54, at 58. SCHUBERT,
G. A., QuANTITATm ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR, supra, footnote 9 at 271,
adopts Tanenhaus' reformulation:
R=1-

number of inconsistencies
number of responses

23 A New Coefficient for Scalogram Analysis, (1953) 17 PuB. OPnIoN Q.
268. S is a more rigorous test for consistency than is R, because its calculation omits not only responses to any question which elicits a nearly unanimous response, but also responses by subjects who respond affirmatively (or
negatively) to most of the questions on the scale. See H. J. Spaeth, supra,
footnote 22, at 58 and 59. SCHuBERT, THE JUDIciAL MNm, supra, footnote 17,
at 81-83.
24 SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, supra,footnote 9, at 269-376, especially 272-289.
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and his
adaptation has been accepted by other judicial behaviour25
alists.

The application of the Schubert adaptation requires that the researcher formulate a "reasonable, non-trivial" 26 hypothesis, for
example, that judges decide civil liberties cases 27 on the basis of their
attitudes toward the deprivation of a civil liberty, rather than on
the basis of the legal considerations relevant to each case. Each nonunanimous case raising a civil liberty issue is treated as posing a
question in the form, "Shall I allow a deprivation of the claimed civil
liberty to the extent represented by this case?" 28 The judges' votes,
and not their reasons for judgment, are taken to be their responses
to the questions posed by each case.
The vote of each judge is classified 29 as a plus or a minus vote
in terms of the attitude which is the subject matter of the hypothesis;
for example, a vote will be classified as plus if it upholds the civil
liberty claim, and as minus if it rejects the claim. The non-unanimous
cases are arranged vertically in order of the number of plus votes
cast in each case; 30 and the judges are arranged
horizontally in order
31
of the number of plus votes cast by each judge.
The Guttman convention that a consistency of ninety per cent of
the votes evidences the dominance of a single attitude is accepted.
Therefore, if, on the scale of civil liberty cases, the coefficient of
reproducibility is .90 or more and the coefficient of scalability is .60
or more, the researcher concludes in accordance with Guttman theory
that civil liberty cases are scalable, that they are unidimensional,
(that is, that they all relate to the same attitudinal dimension), and,
accordingly, that all the judges reach their decisions in civil liberty
cases on the basis of a single dominant attitude-their attitude toward
civil liberties. Thus, the researcher concludes that the hypothesis is
verified.
25 Spaeth, supra,footnote 22, at 58. Both Ulmer, S. Sidney, (Supreme Court
Behavior and Civil Rights, (1960) 13 WEST. POL. Q. 288, at 295), and Gross-

man, Joel B., (Role-Playing and the Analysis of Judicial Behavior: The Case
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter,(1962) 11 J. PuB.L. 285, at 286), refer to SCHUBERT,
QUANTrrATIVE ANALYSIS.
26 SCHUBERT, QUANIiTATIVE ANALYSIS, at 280.
27 The definition of a civil liberties case is discussed below.
28 Ulmer, supra,footnote 25, at 295.
29 Problems involved in classification are discussed below.
30 The cases with 8 affirmative votes and 1 negative vote are placed at
the top of the list and those with 8 negative votes and 1 affirmative vote at
the bottom of the list. Unanimous decisions, either affirmative or negative,
are often omitted from the scale. If they were included, they would be placed
at the top or bottom of the scale; and therefore, of course, inconsistent votes
cannot appear in unanimous decisions.
Note that a scale of judicial decisions contains all non-unanimous cases
decided during a given term or terms which come within the definition of
cases under study. Thus, the scale differs from the normal Guttman scale
which contains only a sample of the questions that might be asked in relation
to the attitude under investigation. See SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, at
274-277.
31 The resulting scale is similar in form to the scale producdd supra. The
members of the court take the place of the subjects on that scale, and the
cases take the place of the statements. For a discussion of the construction
and graphical presentation of the scalogram see SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS, at 281-289.
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The scale is taken to indicate the attitude of each judge in relation
to that of every other judge. The judge at the extreme left is the

one who casts the greatest number of plus votes; the judicial behaviouralists claim that he exhibits the most favourable attitude
to the issue raised by the cases. The remainder of the judges are
ranked from left to right on the scale in accordance with the number
of plus votes cast by each; the behaviouralists argue that the order
in which the judges are ranked indicates the extent to which the
attitude of each favours civil liberty claims. Thus, if a plus vote is
defined as a "liberal" vote, the scale is taken to indicate which judges
32
are "liberal", which are "conservative" and which are "moderate".
The description of any judge as "liberal", "conservative", or "moderate" is, of course, relative to the composition of the court, and to
of the civil liberty claims raised in the cases before
the extremity
33
the court.
The scale directs the researcher's attention to cases containing
inconsistent votes. If a vote is inconsistent because it is based on an
attitude other than the one measured by the scale, the second attitude
may perhaps be identified through the use of subscales. A second
attitude may influence the judges' votes in a case which involves more
than one issue; for example, if a case on the civil liberties scale raises
an issue of states' rights, the judges' votes in that case may be influenced by their attitudes toward states' rights as well as by their
attitudes toward civil liberties. It is possible to construct a subscale
32 In addition to the actual ranking of the judges on the scale, the attitude
of each judge may be compared with that of every other judge in two ways:
(1) by his scale position fixed at the point at which he begins to vote consistently negative (e.g. anti-civil libertarian); and (2) by his scale score
computed by the formula:
2 x scale position
-1
scale score =
number of cases in the scale
Scale scores may range from plus 1.00 (indicating support of the civil
liberty claim in all cases) to minus 1.00 (indicating failure to support the
claim in any case).
Where the attitudes of the judges are measured only by their ranking on
the scale, the measurement is ordinal: that is, we may say only that A who
ranks at the extreme left of the scale is more favourable to civil liberties
than is C, who ranks in the middle ranges, who, in turn, is more favourable
than E at the extreme right. However, measurement by means of the scale
score is interval: that is, it discriminates the degree of difference between
judges, and allows us to say that A with a score of .6 and B with a score of .5
have attitudes which are more similar to each other than that of E with a
score of .2 is to either of them. We may not say, however, that A is three
times as favourable to civil liberties as E is, because there is no zero point,
i.e. a point at which there is a total absence of favourability toward civil
liberties (just as a temperature of 600 F. does not° indicate the presence of
three times as much heat at a temperature of 20 F.). See SCHUBERT, THE
footnote 17 at 124-127, 144-146; TORGERSON, supra footJUDIcIAL MIND, supra&
note 17, at 1.40; NEWCOM, supra, footnote 19, at 501-503; Tanenhaus, Joseph,
The CumuZative Scaling of Judicial Decisions, (1966) 79 HARv. L. REv. 1583,
at 1584-1586.
33 For example, D on the scale shown, supra, would not rank as close
to the far right of the scale if F and G were members of the court and were
situated to the right of D. Similarly, if the civil liberty claim in cases 3, 4, and
5 were no more extreme than those in cases 1 and 2, D would have five plus
votes instead of 2), and would appear to be as liberal as C.
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which contains only those cases on the main scale which raise both
issues. The behaviouralists claim that the subscale enables them to
investigate the extent to which the decisions in those cases are affected
by the attitude to each issue.
1.

2.

3.

Are the votes in the subscale cases sufficiently consistent to
justify the conclusion, on the basis of Guttman theory, that the
attitude toward civil liberties is the dominant attitude governing
the decisions? If not, is it possible to construct an acceptable
scale in terms of the judges' attitudes toward states' rights, and
show that attitude to be dominant in cases raising both issues?
If the subscale shows that the attitude toward civil liberties
remains dominant, it may also indicate whether the attitude
toward states' rights has a significant effect on the operation of
the dominant attitude in the court as a whole. For example, if it
is found that the attitude toward civil liberties remains dominant
in these cases, will the court defer to deprivations of civil liberties
by the states in a greater proportion of cases than it will defer
to deprivations of civil liberties by the national government?
The subscale may indicate whether the secondary attitude has
a significant effect on the operation of the dominant attitude in
the decisions of an individual judge. For example, a judge may
rank in second place on the master scale indicating a favourable
attitude toward civil liberties, and consequently a readiness to
hold that legislation which invades civil liberties is unconstitutional. If this judge ranks in seventh place on the subscale, this
may indicate that his attitude in favour of states' rights inhibits
his attitude in favour of civil liberties, and causes him to be less
ready to hold that state legislation which invades civil liberties
is unconstitutional, than3 4he is to hold that similar federal legislation is unconstitutional.

It will have become apparent from the foregoing, that scalogram
analysis proceeds on the assumption that judges decide cases on the
basis of their attitudes toward policy issues, and not by applying
statutes, precedents and legal rules. The behaviouralists hold that
scalogram analysis verifies that assumption, as they take the scalability of judicial decisions to establish that the decisions are
unidimensional.
If the behaviouralists' assessment of the applicability of cumulative scaling to judicial decisions is accurate, then scalogram analysis
may be used to predict how judges will decide cases. For example,
if a researcher is able to assess the extent of the civil liberty deprivation represented by a pending case and so determine where that case
34 Spaeth, Harold J., Judicial Power as a Variable Motivating Supreme
Court Behavior, (1962) 6 MIDW. POL. Sd. 54 at 69-81; Spaeth, Harold J.,
An Analysis of Judicial Attitudes in the Labour Relations Decisions of the
Warren Court, (1963) 22 J. POL. 290, at 299 to 308; Spaeth, Harold J., Warren
Court Attitudes toward Business: The "B" Scale in SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL DE.
CISION-MAKwG, supra, footnote 17, 79, at 91100. See also SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIvE AwALYSIS, at 288-289.
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fits on the scale,
he may predict how each judge will vote when the
35
case is heard.
The Application of Cumulative Scaling to Judicial Decisions
I will now consider briefly the work of Glendon Schubert, Sidney
Ulmer and Harold Spaeth, who have used the cumulative scalogram
to analyse decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
Glendon Schubert 36 produces a composite picture of the United
States Supreme Court from 1946 to 1963, by scaling all non-unanimous
cases decided during that period.37 The resultant series of scales enables him to examine the constancy of judicial attitudes, the relationships between the attitudes of individual judges, changes in those
attitudes and changes in the collective attitudinal structure of the
court as a whole. He suggests that the voting behaviour of the judges
in all (non-unanimous) cases decided during the seventeen terms
may be explained on the basis of the judges' attitudes toward six
fundamental policy issues: political (i.e., civil) liberalism, economic
liberalism, governmental taxing authority, federalism (conflict between federal and state governmental interests), judicial activism
or restraint and judicial centralisation (the relationship between the
Supreme Court and the lower courts). Of the 1,657 cases decided nonunanimously during the period, approximately one-third raise civil
liberty issues, one-third economic issues, and the remainder one of the
other four issues 38
Schubert analyses the judges' attitudes toward the two major
policy issues, political liberalism and economic liberalism, by constructing two scales for each term of the Court. The C scale contains all
non-unanimous cases raising, as the primary issue, a claim to personal
(as distinguished from property) rights and freedoms, including claims
See Tanenhaus, Cumulative Scaling, supra, footnote 32, at 1588-1589.
Schubert uses Guttman scales of judicial decisions as a step in the
construction of a multidimensional psychometric model of the Supreme Court
of the United States, which, he believes, will enable him to measure the
attitudinal and ideological variables responsible for the voting behaviour
of the judges. His method is to use factor analysis to locate each case in the
psychological space represented by the model, and Guttman scalograms
to locate the relevant attitudes of the judges in the same space. The vote of
any judge in any case can then be explained in terms of the relationship
between the locations of the case and of the judge's attitudes in the space. A
discussion and critique of Schubert's model is beyond the scope of this paper.
See SCHMUERT, TUB JuDIciAL MIN-m, especially at 22-83; The 1960 Term of The
Supreme Court: A Psychological Analysis, (1962). 56 Am. POL. SC. REV. 90,
at 90-93; Judicial Attitudes and Voting Behavior: The 1961 Term of the
United States Supreme Court, (1963) 28 LAw & CoNTeMP. PROB. 100, at 108-112.
Cf. Danelski, David J., Values as Variables in JudicialDecision-Making: Notes
Toward a Theory, (1966) 19 VAND. L REv. 721.
Schubert has also scaled particular groups of cases, e.g., cases concerning
right to counsel, unreasonable search and seizure, and claims of aliens. See
his QuANITATE ANALy
_
s, at 290-376; CONSTI0TIONAL PoLITIcs, (New York:
Holt, Rinehart, 1960); The Study of JudicialDecision-Making as an Aspect of
PoliticalBehavior, (1958) 52 Am. POL. Sci. RaV. 1007, at 1014.
37 SCHUBERT, THE JuDcIAL AUND, supra, footnote 36, at 97-157. The 1960
Term of the Supreme Court: A Psychological Analysis, supra, footnote 36,
at 97-102; Judicial Attitudes and Voting Behavior: The 1961 Term of the
United States Supreme Court, supra, footnote 36, at 119-128.
38 There were 562 cases, 537 cases and 558 cases respectively.
35
36

12

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 5

to freedom of speech, press, religion, assembly and petition, claims
to fair procedure in both state and federal criminal trials and claims
to racial equality. He defines the politically liberal position as favouring these claims.39 The E scale contains all non-unanimous cases
"related to conflicts of interest between the economically affluent
and the economically underprivileged", including fiscal claims of
employees against employers, union-management disputes, governmental regulation of business, disputes between small and large
businessmen and the constitutionality of state taxation. He defines
the economically liberal position as upholding "the underprivileged"
as against "affluence", that is, as upholding the employee, the union,
the governmental regulation, the small business and the validity of
40
the taxation.
Each of the C and E scales for each term from 1946 to 1963 has
acceptable coefficients of reproducibility and scalability. Schubert
concludes that the decisions on the C scale are predominantly motivated by the judges' attitudes toward political liberalism, and those
on the E scale by the judges' attitudes toward economic liberalism.
On each of the term C scales, the judges are ranked from left to
right in accordance with the frequency with which each voted to uphold the civil liberty claim. Those who upheld the claims most often
appear on the left and are designated as politically "liberal" judges;
those who rejected the claims most often appear on the right and are
designated as politically "conservative" judges.
Generally speaking, judges ranked at both ends of the scales,
that is, those designated as extremely "liberal" or extremely "conservative", are characterized by one-sided voting patterns: judges on
the left side of the scale uphold the civil liberty claims, and judges
on the right side of the scale reject 4the
claims in a very high pro1
portion of the cases which they decide.
Schubert interprets these scales as indicating that, on the whole,
the attitudinal relationships among the judges remain constant from
term to term. He claims that the attitude of each judge toward civil
39 SCHJUBERT, TEm JuDIcAL V.IND, supra, footnote 36 at 101. The C scales
for'each term appear at 104-112. The subcomponents of political liberalism
are discussed at 158 to 160 and 170 to 182. Schubert concludes that the only
subcomponents are political freedom (cases involving freedom of speech,
association and press, and loyalty dismissals), and the right to fair procedure
(under the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution). He argues, tentatively, that political equality (racial integration,
legislative reapportionment and citizenship status), the right to privacy
(against violation by agents of the government and self-incrimination) and
religious freedom (exercise and separation of church and state) are not
attitudinal subcomponents of political liberty. However, Schubert arrived
at these views after he had constructed the scales of the 19461963 terms.
Accordingly, the term scales referred to contain cases raising all five subcomponents.
SCHUBERT, TAE JUDIcmAL lMlND, supra, footnote 36 at 127-128. The E
scales for each term appear at 130-138. The subcomponents of economic
liberalism are discussed at 160-170.
41 For example, in 1948, Murphy J. upheld the claim in all 30 C scale cases
and Rutledge J. in 25 of 30 cases. Vinson J. rejected it in 28 of 30 cases, and
Burton J. in 29 of 30 cases. In 1960, Douglas J. upheld the claim in 49 out of
51 cases, and Black J. in 43 of the 51; Clark J. rejected it in 46 out of 51
cases, Harlan J. in 44 out of 50, and Frankfurter J. in 44 out of 51.
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liberties and toward economic policy remains constant relative to the
attitudes of each of the other judges. This is evidenced by the tendency
toward consistency in the rank order of the judges on each of the
term scales in the C scale series, and on each of the term scales in
the E scale series. Many judges hold the same approximate rank positions in each series of scales during the entire length of their tenures. 42
The only fundamental attitudinal changes in individual judges which
Schubert identifies on the political liberalism scales are those of Chief
Justice Warren who became more "liberal" after 1955, and of Mr.
Justice Clark who became more "conservative". 43 The E scales are
taken to indicate that no judge significantly changed his attitude
toward economic liberalism during the seventeen terms investigated.44
The ranking of the judges on the E scale series differs from that
on the C scale series. The "liberal" group 45 is the same in both scales.
But the four economic "conservatives" 46 are politically "moderate".
The economic "moderates" who were appointed before 194947 are
political "conservatives". The economic "moderates" who were ap42 On the C scales for the terms 1946 to 1948, Murphy and Rutledge JJ.
appear on the far left of the scale followed by Douglas and Black JJ. alternating in third and fourth place. Murphy and Rutledge JJ., died after the
1948 term. Douglas and Black JJ. appear (usually in that order) in the first
two positions on the left side of the scales for the terms 1949 to 1962. Reed,
Burton and Vinson JJ. appear generally on the right side of the scales for
the terms 1946 to 1949, as do Reed, Vinson and Minton JJ. on the scales for
1950 to 1952, and Reed, Minton and Burton JJ. on the scales for 1954 and 1955.
However, the position of these judges on the right side is not as consistent as
is that of the judges on the left side of the scale.
43 Tim JuDicim.
MIND, supra, footnote 36 at 116-119. Where there is a
change in a judge's rank position, the inference drawn depends on the circumstances. If the change occurs during a period in which the membership
of the court is constant, Schubert takes it to indicate that the judge's attitude
toward civil liberties has changed. The rank order changes of Chief Justice
Warren and Mr. Justice Clark in the mid-1950s occurred under such circumstances. Schubert states, however, that, during a period when the membership
of the court is changing, a judge's rank on the scale may change, not because
his own attitude changes, but because the attitudes of the new appointees
differ from those of the judges whom they replaced. Since the collective
attitudinal structure of the court has altered, the rank of any individual
judge might change to adjust to that alteration.
For example, Frankfurter J. ranks third (after Douglas and Black JJ.)
on the 1954 C scale, and seventh on the 1960 C scale. Thus, he appears to
have become more "conservative." However, the more accurate explanation
is that his move to the right was caused by Chief Justice Warren's movement
into third place in 1955, which moyed Frankfurter J. into fourth place, and
by the appointment of Brennan J. in 1956 and Stewart J. in 1958, who took
the fourth and fifth positions respectively. See Tim JuDicrAL MND, Supra,
footnote 36 at 120-124.
Schubert suggests, too, that as the court itself selects the appeals which it
hears, the appointment of more "liberal" judges (such as Brennan and
Stewart JJ.) results in the court's hearing appeals which present more
extreme civil liberty claims than those which would have been allowed to
reach the court when its members were more "conservative". A vote by a
justice such as Frankfurter J. against such claims is not evidence that he has
become more conservative in an absolute sense. See THE Juncmi. MIND,
supra,footnote 36 at 1*14 and 118.
44
SCHuTBRT, THE JuDIc AL M=ID, supra,footnote 36, at 141-142.
45 Murphy, Rutledge, Black, Douglas, Warren and Brennan JJ.
46 Whittaker, Jackson, Harlan and Frankfurter JJ.
47 Vinson, Clark, Minton, Reed and Burton JJ.
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pointed after 195748 range politically from "moderate" to "moderateliberal". Because of this lack of correspondence in the rank order of
the two series of scales, Schubert concludes that general liberalism
(containing both political and economic liberalism) is not a scalable
attitude for these terms of the court.49 However, when we combine
the ranks and scores on both scales, the most "liberal" and most "conservative" judges appear to be Douglas J. and Frankfurter J. in 1960,
Douglas J. and Harlan J. in 1961, and Black J. and Harlan J. in 1962.
Schubert suggests 50 that the cases not decided on the basis of
the judges' attitudes toward the two major policy issues are decided on
the basis of their attitudes toward the four other issues, governmental
taxing authority, federalism, judicial activism and judicial centralisation. However, during most of the terms studied, there was an insufficient number of cases relating to these issues to produce scales. 51
Sidney Ulmer has made scales of all civil liberty decisions of the
United States Supreme Court in each of the six terms between 1956
and 1961.52 He finds that the scales have acceptable coefficients in each
year, when scaled in terms of the judges' attitudes to a deprivation of
a claimed civil liberty. He concludes, therefore, that the judges make
their decisions not by asking "What does the law require?" in each
particular case, and not by considering constitutional provisions,
legislation and precedent, but on the basis of their attitudes toward
53
civil liberty claims.
48 Goldberg, Stewart, and White JJ. See SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND,
supra, footnote 36, at 143-144.
49 Ibid., 97-98.
50 Ibid., 146-157.
51 There were sufficient cases to allow Schubert to construct four F
scales of cases concerning government taxing authority and one N scale of
cases concerning federalism (conflict between national and state governmental interest). Ibid., pp. 151-152. It is of interest that although Black and
Douglas JJ. rank next to each other on the left side of the C and E scales
for the 17 terms, (with minor variations in the C scales for 1946, 1947 and 1948,
and in the E scales for 1946, 1948 and 1961.)
Black J. ranks considerably to the left of Douglas J. on the four F scales,
indicating that Black J. is more inclined than Douglas J. to uphold government taxing authority because he sees the issue as one of government
regulation of individuals, that is, as an issue related to political liberalism.
On the other hand, he suggests the economic "conservatives" vote against
government taxing authority because they see the case as raising an Issue
related to government interference with free enterprise. Economic "liberals"
such as Douglas J. vote in favour of government taxing authority, because
they, too, see the issue as one related to economic liberalism.
52 Ulmer, S. Sidney, Supreme Court Behavior and Civil Rights, (1960) 13
WEST. POL. Q. 288 (1956 and 1957 C Scales); The Analysis of Behavior Patterns on the United States Supreme Court, (1960) 22 J. POL. 629, at 647-652
(1958 C Scale); Scaling Judicial Cases: A Methodological Note, (1961) 4 AM.
BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 31 (1959 C Scale); A Note on Attitudinal Consistency
in the United States Supreme Court, (1961) 22 INDIAN J. POL. Sci. 195 (1960
C Scale); Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Processes: Some Practical and

Theoretical Applications, (1963) 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 164, at 169-170

(1961 C Scale). See also Judicial Review as Political Behavior: A Temporary
Check on Congress, (1960) 4 ADumT. Sci. Q. 426, in which Ulmer scales all
cases decided between 1920 and 1939, in which the court held federal legislation to be unconstitutional.
53 Supreme Court Behavior and Civil Rights, at 295; The Analysis of
Behavior Patterns on the United States Supreme Court, at 647; Quantitative
Analysis of Judicial Processes, at 169; all cited, supra, footnote 52.
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The ranking of the judges on Ulmer's scales, closely approximates
the ranking on Schubert's "C" scales.5 4 The judges maintain an almost
identical ranking on the scales over a period of years, and Ulmer
takes this to indicate that the attitude of each remains constant,
relative to those of the other members of the court. He concludes,

therefore, that the findings made possible by the scalograms (used in

conjunction with other predictive devices) 55 afford a reliable basis for
the prediction of future decisions, as long as the membership of the
56
court remains constant.
One of the most interesting applications of scalogram analysis
to the judicial process, is Harold Spaeth's use of subscales to examine
the extent to which judges' attitudes toward secondary issues in
multiple-issue cases affect their decisions.
Spaeth scaled all cases decided by the United States Supreme
Court between 1953 and 1959, which contain an issue involving labour

unions or government regulation of business.5 7 He constructs his scales

in terms of the judges' attitudes toward economic liberalism, which
he defines as "pro-union (as distinct from members of unions ...),
54 The judges' ranking on Schubert's and Ulmer's C scales for the 1956
to 1961 terms are as follows:
1956 SCHUBERT:
Douglas, Black, Warren, Brennan, Frankfurter, Harlan, Whittaker, Burton, Reed, Clark
ULMWER:
Douglas Black, warren, Brennan, Frankfurter, Harlan, Whittaker, Burton, Clark, Reed
1957 SCRUBERT.
Dougas, Black, Warren, Brennan, Frankfurter, Harlan, Whittaker, Burton, Clark
Douglas, Black, warren, Brennan, Frankfurter, Harlan, Whittaker, Burton, Clark
1958 SCHUBERT:
Douglas, Black, Warren, Brennan, Stewart, Whittaker, Frankfurter, Harlan, Clark
Douglas. Black, warren, Brennan, Whittaker, Frankfurter, Harlan, Stewart, Clark
1959 SCHUBERT:
Dougas, Black, Warren, Brennan, Stewart, Harlan, Frankfurter, Whittaker, Clark
Douglas, Black, warren, Brennan, Stewart, Frankfurter, Harlan, Whittaker, Clark
1960 SCHUBERT:
Douglas, Black, Warren, Brennan, Stewart, Whittaker, Frankfurter, Harlan, Clark
ULVMER:
Douglas
Black, warren, Brennan, Stewart, Harlan, Frankfurter, Whittaker, Clark
1961 SCHUBERT:
Black Douglas, Warren, Brennan, Stewart, White, Whittaker, Frankfurter, Harlan, Clark
ULAIR:
Douglas, Warren, Black, Brennan, Stewart, Harlan, Frankfurter, White, Clark, Whittaker

55 Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Processes: Some Practical and

TheoreticalApplications, supra, footnote 52, at 170-176.
56 A

Note on Attitudinal Consistency in the United States Supreme Court,

202-204; The Analysis of Behavior Patterns on the United States Supreme
Court, 648-650; both cited, supra, footnote 52.

In his earlier articles, Ulmer analyses the facts and reasons for judgment
in cases containing more than one inconsistent vote and in the break-point
case for each judge, that is, the first case in which each judge rejects the civil
liberty claim. These discussions complement the scalogram analysis, as inconsistent votes invite explanation, and as the break-point cases indicate
differences in the behaviour of judges who have similar voting patterns.
Ulmer defines as a civil liberty case, any case involving a claimed right
of the type covered by the Bill of Rights and the post-Civil War amendments
to the American Constitution. This definition is as broad as that used by
Schubert, and includes both substantive claims (claims based on freedom of
speech, the rights of citizenship) and claims to procedural due process in
criminal trials (protection against former jeopardy, the use of illegally
obtained evidence and confessions, and the right to jury trial and the assistance of counsel). Furthermore, the definition includes claims under both
constitutional arid statutory provisions. See Supreme Court Behavior and Civil
Liberties, supra,footnote 52, at 288.
57 Warren Court Attitudes Toward Business: The "B" Scale, in SCHUBERT,
JuDIcAL DECISION-MAKINO, (1963) 79-108.
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pro-competition and anti-business". 58 As the resulting E scale5 9 has an

acceptable level of consistent votes, he concludes that it verifies his
thesis that the judges decide these cases not on the basis of the legal
issues involved in each case, but on the basis of their attitudes toward
economic policy. Spaeth then constructs the B subscale 6o containing
those E scale cases which concern regulation of business, and the W
subscale 6 containing those E scale cases which concern trade unions.
As both subscales have acceptable levels of consistency, he concludes
that the cases on each scale are decided on the basis of a single
dominant attitude, that is, attitude toward business and toward labour

unions, respectively.
The ranking of judges on each of these subscales is practically
identical with their ranking on the E scale, 62 and Spaeth takes this
to mean that there is a high correlation between the attitudes of most
judges toward labour and business, "pro-labour" judges being "antibusiness", and "anti-labour" judges being "pro-business". Spaeth concludes that the high level of consistency of these two attitudes justifies
combining them to comprise a single attitude toward economic
liberalism.

63

Spaeth uses subscales to examine whether the Court's decisionmaking in either B scale cases or W scale cases is influenced, in a
significant way, by considerations of states' rights or of deference to
decision-making by administrative agencies, two factors which the
courts have identified as influential.
To determine the effect of states' rights, he compares a subscale
of all cases in which state legislation opposed business with a subscale
Ibid., 79.
During the seven terms (which are the first seven terms of the Warren
Court), the Court decided 241 decisions relating to economic issues. Ninety.
seven decisions were unanimous. Of the 144 non-unanimous decisions, ninetythree involve the regulation of business, and fifty-one involve labour unions.
Ibid., 81.
60 Supra, footnote 57 at 86.
61 Ibid., at 84; An AnaZysis of Judicial Attitudes in the Labour Relations
Decisions of the Warren Court, (1963) 22 J.POL. 290-311.
62 The E and B scale ranking is Douglas, Black, Warren, Brennan, Clark,
Stewart, Minton, Reed, Burton, Jackson, Frankfurter, Harlan and Whittaker,
JJ. The W scale ranking is identical for the first five and last three positions;
however, the judges in the middle positions are in the following order: Burton,
Reed, Stewart, Jackson and Minton, JJ.
Schubert found that the extreme "liberal" and "conservative" judges have
highly correlated attitudes toward business and unions, but that the
"moderate" judges do not. Schubert's scale of attitudes toward business (for
an overlapping period) correlates with Spaeth's. However, his scale of
attitudes toward unions differs from Spaeth's with respect to the judges in the
middle ranks. See T
JUIcAL
1m MND, 167-8.
63 Warren Court Attitudes, supra, footnote 57, at 88.
In spite of the rank order consistency, however, Clark appears as a fairly
strong "liberal" on the B scale (61 anti-business decisions out of 85 participations), and as a moderate "conservative": on the W scale (30 anti-union
decisions out of 51 participations). His designation on the E scale as a
"moderate liberal" (82 pro-economic liberalism decisions out of 136 parttcpations), suggests that, at least for him, it is misleading to consder the B and
W subscales as forming one scale (E), or, in other words, to consider his
attitudes toward business and unions as a single attitude toward economic
liberalism.
58
59
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of all cases in which national legislation opposed business;64 and a
subscale of all cases in which state legislation opposed unions with one
of all cases in which national legislation opposed unions. 65 As the
subscales, constructed in terms of attitude toward economic liberalism,
have acceptable coefficients, he concludes that the decisions are made
on the basis of the judges' attitudes toward economic liberalism and
not on the basis of states' rights considerations. He concludes, from
an examination of the subscales, that, speaking generally, the economically "liberal" judges oppose state legislation where the legislation
opposes unions or supports business, and uphold state legislation where
the legislation opposes business or supports unions. The economically
"conservative" judges generally do the opposite. Thus, Spaeth concludes that in cases raising both issues (economic liberalism and
states' rights), most judges are not motivated by considerations of
states' rights. 66 Spaeth argues that this is true even of Mr. Justice
64 Ibid., 91-95.

An Analysis of JudicialAttitudes, supra, footnote 61, at 299-302.
See also Spaeth, H.J., JudicialPower as a Variable Motivating Supreme
Court Behavior, (1962) 6 MrDW. J. POL. Sc., 54. Spaeth investigates the "true
judicial power" cases, that is, those in which variables such as civil liberties
and economic liberalism are either absent, or subordinate to considerations
of the exercise of power by the Court. He concludes that attitude toward
states' rights is a third order variable, and is overridden not only by the
judges' attitudes toward economic liberalism (a primary variable), but also
by their attitudes toward judicial activism-restraint (a secondary variable).
67 An Analysis of Judicial Attitudes, supra, footnote 61, at 306; Warren
Court Attitudes, supra, footnote 57, at 95. Mr. Justice Frankfurter ranks
eleventh of thirteen judges on the subscale of cases in which federal regulation opposes business, and tenth on the subscale of cases in which state
regulation opposes business. He attains this position on the right side of
both subscales because Spaeth classified a relatively large number of his
votes as being opposed to the regulation of business, whether such regulation
is by the state or federal government. Spaeth's point is that if Frankfurter
J. were concerned with states' rights, he would defer to regulation of business
by the states (as opposed to regulation by the federal government). If he
did so, he would rank lower (i.e. closer to the left side) on the subscale of
cases involving state regulation opposed to business. Such a shift in rank
order on a subscale indicates that the judge's decisions in cases appearing on
that subscale are influenced by his attitude to the second issue in those cases
(here, attitude to states' rights), in addition to or instead of his attitude
to the primary issue in all the cases on the main scale (here, economic liberalism). In the case of Frankfurter J., Spaeth finds that such a shift in rank
does not occur.
Wallace Mendelson denies that Spaeth has established that Frankfurter
J. lacks concern for states' rights. He maintains that in eleven of the
eighteen cases cited by Spaeth, the state regulation opposed to business is
extraterritorial in nature; accordingly, he says, such regulations do not
attract the protection afforded by the states' rights principle. If Mendelson is
right, Spaeth's conclusion that Frankfurter J. is not concerned to protect
state autonomy is unwarranted, as it is based on scales containing cases which
have been inaccurately classified. (I discuss problems of classification below.)
Mendelson does not say whether, in his opinion, Spaeth's subscale of cases
in which state regulation opposed unions contains cases in which the regulations are extraterritorial. According to Spaeth's scales, Frankfurter J. decides
the majority of those cases in favour of the state regulation. See W. Mendelson, The Untroubled World of Jurimetrics, (1964) 26 J. POL. 914 at 920.
In evaluating the conclusion that Frankfurter J. is not concerned with
states' rights in E scale cases, we should bear in mind the following statistics
revealed by the subscales. Although the court as a whole upholds a slightly
higher percentage of the scaled cases of federal regulation than of state
regulation of business (68% as opposed to 61%), Frankfurter J., himself,
[Footnote continued on next page]
65
66
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Frankfurter who often states in his opinions that the Court should

defer to state legislation.67 The only judge whom Spaeth identifies
as being influenced by considerations of states' rights in these cases
68
is Mr. Justice Clark.
To determine whether the Court is influenced by a desire to defer
to agency decision-making in B or W cases challenging an order of an
administrative agency, Spaeth prepares a subscale of all cases in
which an agency decision opposed business and one of all cases in
which an agency decision supported business, 69 and corresponding
subscales of agency regulation of trade unions. 70 He concludes that
such cases are decided on the basis of the judges' attitudes toward
economic liberalism, and not on the basis of the enunciated policy
that the court should defer to the decisions of administrative
agencies.71 Generally speaking, he finds that the economically
"liberal" judges uphold the agencies' pro-union and anti-business
decisions, and the economically "conservative" judges uphold the
agencies' pro-business and anti-union decisions? 2 It should be noted,
however, that Joseph Tanenhaus, 73 in a separate study, suggests that
upholds a slightly higher percentage of scaled cases of state regulation than
of federal regulation (27% as opposed to 19%). This is reflected in a difference
in his scale scores: -. 66 in the federal subscale and -. 44 in the state subscale. (See Warren Court Attitudes, supra, footnote 57, at 91-94.) Furthermore,
Frankfurter J. upholds a slightly higher percentage of scaled cases of state
regulation than of federal regulation of trade unions (90% as opposed to
75%); in this he follows the tendency of the court which upholds 75% of
the scaled cases of state regulatibn and 60% of the scaled cases of federal
regulation. (See An Analysis of Judicial Attitudes, supra, footnote 61, at
300, 302.)
Thus, Frankfurter J. shows a somewhat greater deference to state regulation than he shows to federal regulation.
See also GRoSSmAN, J. B., Role Playing and the Anlysis of Judicial

Behavior: The Case of Justice Frankfurter,(1963) 11 J. PuB. L.) 285; Spaeth,
H. J., The Judicial Restraint of Mr. Justice Frankfurter-Myth or Reality,
(1964) 8 MmW. J. POL. Sci. 22.
68 See Analysis of JudicialAttitudes, supra,footnote 61, at 301,305 and 306.
Clark ranks in a tie with one other judge for fifth place on the subscale of
cases in which national regulation opposed unions; that is, he defers to federal
regulation less often than 7 of the 12 other judges who were members of the
court between 1953 and 1959. But he ties with four other judges for sixth
place on the subscale of cases in which state regulation opposed unions; that
is he defers to state regulation less often than only three of the other twelve
judges. His greater deference to state regulation in these cases is evidence
that his attitude to states' rights is a secondary variable which, along with
his attitude to economic liberalism, affects his decision-making. This conclusion
is buttressed by his ranking in eighth place on a subscale of cases in which
national regulation supported unions. That he is less willing to support
federal regulation than state regulation, is consistent with a concern for
states' rights. See Warren Court Attitudes, supra, footnote 57, at 92-93.
69 An Analysis of JudicialAttitudes, supra, footnote 61, at 299-308.
70 Warren Court Attitudes, supra,footnote 57, at 91-100.
71 See SCHmERT, Tm JuDiciiL MInD, 161-3 for a similar conclusion.
72 Spaeth concludes that only Minton, Burton and Brennan J. show
deference to agency decisions in business cases, and only to a marginally sig.
nificant extent. (Warren Court Attitudes, supra, footnote 57, at 97.) Only
Burton and Reed 33. show deference to decisions of the National Labor
Relations Board. (An Analysis of Judicial Attitudes, supra, footnote 61, at
307-8.)
73 In Supreme Court Attitudes Toward Federal Administrative Agencies,
(1963) 22 3. POL. 502, 516-517, Tanenhaus concludes that the voting behaviour
[Footnote continued on next page]
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in cases in which the Court reviews federal agency decisions, most of
the judges are not motivated by their attitudes toward economic
policy. Until these conclusions are reconciled, the question must be
considered open.
Critique
As I have attempted to show, Schubert, Spaeth and Ulmer bring
to the study of the judicial process a theory of attitudinal measurement
developed by social psychologists. They attempt to understand
judicial decision-making by concentrating on judges rather than on
cases, on judicial votes rather than on judicial opinions, and on the
judges' attitudes toward policies rather than on the legal principles,
statutes and precedents which judges cite. Apart from their application of the Guttman theory, their approach to the judicial process
would not have appeared alien to the American legal realists.
The legal realists were well aware that in at least some cases
judges have a wide discretion, that the exercise of that discretion
may depend upon extra-legal policy preferences and that the reasons
given in opinions may not represent the route by which judges reach
decisions, but rather a rationalization to satisfy the requirements of a
professional tradition. One suspects that the legal realists would have
welcomed the empirical work done by the behaviouralists, but would
have been critical of the theoretical framework which leads them to
assert, almost as a matter of doctrine, that all judges decide law cases
in accordance with a single dominant attitude toward policy issues.
The behaviouralists purport to justify that assertion on the basis
of the Guttman theory of cumulative scaling, which holds that scalability with certain conventional levels of consistency evidences unidimensionality. There is, however, a convincing body of opinion and
evidence to suggest that, for scales of judicial decision, scalability
does not evidence unidimensionality. We must recall that Guttman
theory was developed in connection with scales containing relatively
simple questions, to which each subject is directed to respond in
accordance with his own feelings. It is for this reason that the
analyst expects the responses to reflect the subjects' attitudes. Furthermore, the researcher who prepares the scales attempts to compose
questions which are related to a single attitudinal dimension and are
distributed over the entire range of that dimension. It is for this
reason that the researcher expects each subject to affirm all statements up to a certain point, and to disagree with those beyond that
point. In short, the conclusion that the scalability of responses establishes that the responses are motivated by a single dominant attitude
rests on the assumption that the subjects feel free to respond on the
of most judges in cases reviewing the decisions of a given agency, does not
reveal statistically significant policy and value preferences in cases involving
organized labour, and in cases involving restrictions on competition. Tanenhaus' study differs from Spaeth's in the data studied (Tanenhaus examined
federal administrative cases decided by the United States Supreme Court
during the 1947-56 terms), the method of analysis (Tanenhaus used statistical
tests of significance) and in the criteria for case selection.
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basis of their attitudes, and that the items eliciting the responses are
widely distributed along a single attitudinal continuum.
To the extent that the proposition that scalability evidences unidimensionality rests on the assumption that, in spite of their protests
to the contrary, judges feel free to decide cases on the basis of their
attitudes toward policy, the judicial behaviouralists must assume the
very thing they purport to demonstrate. Furthermore, the behaviouralists have not shown that the cases which appear on each scale
raise issues which relate to a single attitudinal dimension. The C
scale, for example, as defined by Ulmer and Spaeth and as originally
defined by Schubert, includes not only cases which raise claims for
substantive freedoms of different sorts (speech, assembly, religion),
but also cases which raise claims for procedural safeguards of different
sorts (right to counsel, protection against illegally obtained evidence).
There is no reason to assume that these very different sorts of claims
are the objects of a single attitude. 74
Schubert, himself, suggests a different sort of reason for rejecting
the contention that scalabiity at the conventional level evidences
unidimensionality for scales of judicial cases. He points out that the
level of agreement of United States Supreme Court judges is so high
(in part, because of their similar professional and socio-economic
backgrounds) that the normal requirement that ninety per cent of
all votes cast be consistent, is not sufficient to guarantee unidimensionality.75 This suggestion seems to be consistent with the view put
forward by social psychologists, that the responses of a group of
subjects who are well acquainted with the objects of the attitude under
investigation, will be more consistent than those of a group of unin76
formed subjects.
It is generally admitted that a weakness of cumulative scaling is
the lack of a uniform criterion for testing scalability.7 7 The coefficient
of reproducibility is not satisfactory as it tends to be high if the scale
includes many unanimous or nearly unanimous decisions. The coefficient of scalability, which was designed to overcome the defects of
the coefficient of reproducibility, is itself high if the scale includes
many cases in which the court divides nearly evenly (5-4, 6-3) along
74 Indeed, Schubert's most recent view is that three of the subcomponents
Of the C scale as originally conceived by him (political equality, right to
privacy and religious freedom) relate to attitudes which are different from
the attitude to which the other two subcomponents (political freedom and
fair procedure) relate. See supra, footnote 39. If Schubert is right, the fact
that his C scale cases, as originally defined, form an acceptable scale, itself
suggests that, for judicial cases, scalability does not evidence unidimensionality.
Even if cases on a scale relate to a single attitudinal continuum, it has
been suggested that Schubert's method of ordering cases does not necessarily
arrange the cases ordinally on the intensity continuum, and accordingly,
that it cannot be assumed that the judges are ranked ordinally. See Tanenhaus, supra,footnote 35 at 1590-1592.
75 See Bibliographical Essay, supra,footnote 1, at 442.
76 Newcomb, T. M., supra,footnote 19, at 517.
77 SCHBSERT, TAE JuDiciAL MIND, 78-80. See also Torgerson, supra, footnote 17, at 322-324.
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the same lines.7 8 Thus, the value of the R and S coefficients may be
"acceptable" (i.e. over .90 and .60 respectively), even when it is clear
that the decisions in the scaled cases could not have been reached on
the basis of a single attitude.79
For these reasons, students of the judicial process should be
unwilling to accept the scalability of judicial decisions as evidence of
unidimensionality.8 0 It follows, then, that the scalogram analysts are
not able to establish, simply by producing "acceptable" scales, that
judicial decisions are determined by the judges' attitudes toward
policy issues. The existence of a scale does not establish that the judges
vote as they do because they base their votes on their attitude to
policy. That is to say, the existence of a scale does not explain8'
why judges vote as they do.
Nevertheless, the work of the judicial behaviouralists is valuable
for an understanding of the judicial process because the scalogram
is an informative descriptive device. The scalogram focuses on voting
behaviour in large numbers of related non-unanimous decisions, highlighting the voting patterns of individual judges and of the court as
a whole. It permits the construction of a composite picture of the
judges' voting behaviour over a period of years as the membership
of the court changes. Subscales enable the researcher to isolate groups
of cases which contain a common secondary issue, and to focus upon
78 Tanenhaus, supra, footnote 35 at 1593. See also Torgerson, supra, footnote 17 at 323.

Ibid. Tanenhaus, supra, footnote 35, at 1593, reports the following:
"If one takes all the cases in Volume 355 of the United States Reports
handed down on days of the month divisible by three, and then classifies
them so that a favorable vote is assigned when a Justice supported
petitioners (or appellants) with even docket numbers or opposed those
with odd docket numbers, and a negative vote for the reverse behavior,
one obtains an S of .62."
G. A. Schubert anticipated this reductio ad absurdum, and specified that
the researcher's hypothesis must be "reasonable and non-trivial". See supra,
footnote 26. And see QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIoR, 280-281:
".... it would be trivial to test votes in favor of criminal defendants
with Irish names decided by the court during the same period-even if the
resulting scalogram should have an 'acceptable' C R and meet other
technical criteria."
80 Note that both Schubert and Spaeth have expressed surprise that
certain scales exhibit an acceptable degree of consistency. Schubert states in
an early article that every hypothesis he tested up to that time resulted in
an acceptable scale. See Schubert, The Study of Judicial Decision-Making
as an Aspect of Political Behavior, supra, footnote 36, at 1016; Spaeth, H. J.,
Judicial Power, supra, footnote 66 at 80-81. Furthermore, Spaeth points out
that under Guttman's theory of scaling, one normally expects inconsistent
votes to be concentrated at the respondent's break-point (that is, the point
at which he begins to respond negatively), because this is the "zone of
indecision" where his attitude changes from favourable to unfavourable.
However, in scales of judicial decisions, inconsistent votes are not distributed
in this way. That they are not, is consistent with the view that the cases do
not relate to a single attitude. See Warren Court Attitudes, supra, footnote
57, at 90; Sprague, John, Error, Information and Unidimensionality:A Note
on Some Methodological Problems in the Cumulative Scaling of Judicial
Voting Records (Dept. of Political Science, Washington University, St. Louis,
Mo., to be published.)
81 See Becker, T.L., Inquiry into a School of Thought in the Judicial
Behavior Movement, (1963) MImW. J. POL. Sci. 254 at 260-262; PoITIcAL
BEHAVIORALISM AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE, (1964) 17-19. I am indebted to
Becker for his discussion of description and explanation.
79
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voting patterns in those cases. Thus, scalogram analysis may enable
the researcher to discover that certain relationships exist between
judges' votes and the policy issue raised by the cases; for example, that
the effect of most of the votes of some judges is consistently to uphold
(or, to oppose) civil liberty claims, and that the effect of the votes of
other judges is sometimes to uphold and sometimes to oppose such
claims.
An instrument which describes the effect of judicial votes on
policy issues is valuable although it does not in itself explain why the
judges voted as they do 82 because it may assist the researcher to
arrive at such an explanation. Having discovered a relationship
between the judges' votes and policy, the researcher will be able to
examine its significance. By analysing the issues, the reasons for
judgment, the unanimous cases not on the scale, and the voting
behaviour in the scaled cases, he may conclude that some judges do
reach their decisions on the basis of their attitudes to the policy issues
involved.
In short, I suggest that the scalogram does not do everything the
behaviouralists claim for it, but that it is helpful for what it does.
The scalogram does not explain why the judges vote as they do; that
is, it does not warrant the conclusion that their votes are based on
their attitudes to the policy issues raised by the cases. It does not
establish that their votes are based on any single attitude. But, it
does describe the effect of their votes in terms of values. With the
help of the scalogram description of the effect of the judges' votes,
the researcher may be able to explain on what basis the votes are
cast. For some judges in some cases (not for all judges in all cases),
the explanation may be that the votes are based on the judges'
attitudes to the policy issues raised in the cases.82a
A view of the scalogram as a descriptive device only, and a
rejection of the assumption that scalability evidences unidimensionality, involves, of course, an abandonment of the theoretical foundations of Guttman cumulative scaling and of the pretension that the
scalogram is a step in the development of a "science" (in the technical
sense) of the judicial process. The behaviouralists believe that their
work constitutes the beginnings of such a science, which, when developed, will afford theoretical knowledge (not simply empirical
82 Cf. Tanenhaus, Supreme Court Attitudes, supra, footnote 73, at 510:
"It is extremely important to remember that a test of significance
cannot tell us whether a hypothesized relationship is important or trivial,
nor can it tell us why a justice acted as he did. All that the test can do
is to indicate with what probable error we may assume that a postulated
relationship exists." (The italics are mine.)
82a Wallace Mendelson, who is generally critical of the judicial behaviouralists' work, is willing to concede that a judge who consistently decides
cases in favour of a certain value, for example, one who consistently upholds
or opposes the civil liberty claim, and who, as a result, appears at the extreme
left or right of the behaviouralists' scales, likely bases his decisions on his
attitude toward that value; however, he argues that there is no reason to
say that a judge whose decisions are more evenly balanced in favour of and
in opposition to the value, and who therefore ranks in the middle of the
scale, bases his decisions on his attitude toward the value. See, Mendelson W.,
The Neo-BehavioraZ Approach to the JudicialProcess: A Critique, (1963), 57
Am. POL. Sci. REV. 593 at 598.
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knowledge) 83 about the judicial process. It seems desirable, however,
for lawyers to adopt the techniques of analysis devised by members
of other disciplines to the extent that they appear to be reliable, and
to leave to social scientists and mathematicians the larger task of
developing a scientific basis for an explanation of the judicial process,
if it is possible to do so.
As I have indicated that I believe that scalogram analysis, as a
descriptive device, may throw light on the workings of the judicial
process, I wish to discuss some of the difficulties involved in its use.
The traditional legal scholar, the legal realist and the behaviouralist, all hope to find regularities in judicial decision-making which
will enable them to formulate general principles descriptive of judicial
behaviour. This is necessary for accurate prediction. Both the traditional legal scholar and the realist focus on the reasons for judgment,
the former to see what rules the judges apply, and the latter to discover the "real", perhaps unstated, rules, principles and policies underlying decisions. The behaviouralist, although he shares with the
legal realist the quest for the "real" rather than the stated reasons
for decisions, focuses on the judges' votes rather than on their
opinions.
The relative merits of opinions and votes as data for investigation
are discussed by Tanenhaus. 84 The behaviouralists argue that perusing
opinions may not assist explanation or prediction because a judge
may not express his real reasons, either because tradition demands
that he not do so or because he has not perfectly articulated them;
secondly, that judges vote more often than they write opinions, and,
therefore, that voting behaviour may be the only available data; and,
thirdly, that it is possible to record votes in a value-free way and so
arrive at an objective description or explanation of the judicial process. 85 The critics of judicial behaviouralism point out that counting
votes oversimplifies the choices which judges must make between
competing values; 86 and that it is not valid to count each vote equally,
as some decisions are more important than others. 87 Mendelson takes
issue particularly with the claim that by focusing on the judges'
votes, the behaviouralist avoids a subjective evaluation of the judges'
behaviour. Mendelson appears to suggest not only that it is impossible
to classify votes objectively, but also that it is impossible to classify
them at all.88
83 Schubert, G. A., JudicialAttitudes and Voting Behavior: The 1961 Term
of the United States Supreme Court, supra,footnote 36, at 100-107, 142.

84 Tanenhaus, J., Supreme Court Attitudes Toward Federal Administrative Agencies (1963) 22 J. POL., 502, 502-504; Supreme Court Attitudes Toward
Federal Administrative Agencies, 1947-56-An Application of Social Science
Methods to the Study of the Judicial Process, (1960-61) 14 Vand. L. Rev.

473, 480-482.
85 See Tanenhaus, supra, footnote 84; Spaeth, H. J., An Approach to the

Study of Attitudinal Differences as an Aspect of Judicial Behavior, (1961)
5 MmW. J. PoL. Sci. 165, at 180.
86 Mendelson, W., The Neo-Behavioral Approach, supra, footnote 82a
at 596.

87 Ibid., 595.

88 The Untroubled World of Jurimetrics, (1964) 22 J. PoL. 914, at 916, 918.
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I suggest that the behaviouralists are wrong when they claim
that votes may be classified objectively, and that Mendelson is wrong
when he claims that votes cannot be classified meaningfully at all. I
suggest that the classification of votes requires a subjective decision;
that that decision, although subjective, may be meaningful; and
that the reader who consults a scalogram is able to assess it intelligently if he is informed of the problems which the researcher encountered in classifying the votes, and of the way in which those
problems were solved.
One difficulty in the use of the scalogram as a descriptive device
concerns the classification of judges' votes in cases containing more
than one issue. Scalogram analysis requires the researcher to abstract
from a series of cases (many of which raise more than one issue), a
single issue, for example, civil liberty claims, and to classify each
judge's vote in each case in terms of that issue (for example, as upholding or rejecting the civil liberty claim). Of course, an individual
judge whose vote has the effect of rejecting the claim, may actually
base his vote on a different issue in the case. He may not intend to
vote against the civil liberty claim, except in the sense that he knows
that his vote on the other issue has the effect of rejecting the civil
liberty claim.
The classification of such a vote on a scalogram as a vote in
opposition to the civil liberty claim is a misdescription, if the classification is regarded as indicating that the judge intends to vote
against the civil liberty claim. The behaviouralists do regard the
votes on their scalograms in that light.8 9 However, the classification
is quite accurate if the scalogram is understood (as I suggest it should
be) only as describing the effect of the vote as rejecting the civil
liberty claim.
It is, of course, difficult for the researcher to relate such a
description to an explanation of the votes in terms of the judge's
attitude toward the civil liberty claim. For the purpose of arriving
at such an explanation, it seems desirable and legitimate to develop
techniques which will permit the researcher, where possible, to classify
the judge's behaviour in a way that reflects the effect his decision
would have on the civil liberty claim if he based his decision on
that claim.
Accordingly, I propose that in order to examine judicial behaviour
in multi-issue cases, the researcher prepare three scales:
(1) On the first scale, the behaviour of each judge will be
classified in accordance with its effect on the primary issue
(for example, the civil liberty claim).
(2) On the second scale, the behaviour of each judge will be
classified as follows:
(a) if the judge says that he bases his vote on the primary
issue, the vote will be classified accordingly;
89 3. B. Grossman and W. Mendelson point out that they are not justified
in doing so. See Grossman, J. B., RoZe-Playing and the AnaZysis of Judical
Behavior: The Case of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, (1962) 11 J. PuB. L. 285, at

2934; Mendelson, supra,footnote 82a at 596.
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(b) if the judge indicates that his views on both issues are
such that he bases his vote on both, then the vote will
be classified as if it were based on the primary issue
alone;
(c) if the judge says that he bases his vote on the secondary
issue, but indicates how he would vote on the primary
issue, the vote will be classified in accordance with that
indication; and
(d) if the judge says that he bases his vote on the secondary
issue and says nothing about the primary issue, or says
that he does not base his vote on the primary issue, his
vote will not be counted.9 0
(3) On the third scale, decisions falling within classes (a), (b)
and (c) will be classified as they are on the second scale.
Decisions falling within class (d) will be classified in accordance with the effect that the judge's decision has on the
primary issue. This will reflect the judge's willingness to
allow his vote on the secondary issue to have the effect
which it does have on the primary issue.9 1
The first scale shows the effect of all votes on the primary issue.
The second scale shows how the primary issue is affected by the
votes of those judges who vote on it, and how it would be affected by
the votes of judges who do not vote on it, but who indicate how
they would vote on it. The second scale does not deal with the
behaviour of judges who neither vote on the primary issue, nor
indicate how they would vote on the primary issue. The second
scale relates the effect of votes to the judges' attitudes toward the
primary issue, more clearly than does the first scale. The third
scale relates votes and attitudes less clearly than the second in one
sense, because it includes votes of judges who neither vote on the
primary issue nor indicate how they would vote on the primary issue.
On the other hand, it throws additional light on the way votes relate
to attitudes, by showing the effect on the primary issue of votes which
judges base on the secondary issue, but which they know will affect
the primary issue.
I suggest that the three scales will describe the multi-dimensional
behaviour of judges in multi-issue cases more accurately than a single
scale can do. Taken together, they will afford complementary descriptions of judicial behaviour in terms which will help the analyst bridge
the gap between the effect of a vote on the primary issue, and the
attitude of the judge toward that issue.
A further problem of classification concerns cases for which it is
difficult to determine in what way a vote affects the value which the
analyst wishes to investigate. For example, it may be difficult to
determine whether a vote is pro-business or anti-business for the
90 Cf. Schubert, G. A., The 1960 Term of the Supreme Court: A PsychoZogicaZ Analysis, suprat, footniote 36, at 93. Schubert reports that he classified

three jurisdictional dissents by Frankfurter J. as non-participations.
91 Judicial behaviour of the type discussed in category (d) may also be
described by the use of subscales.
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purpose of Spaeth's E scale. Mendelson comments on problems which
arise in classifying votes in terms of Spaeth's definition of economic
liberalism (as, inter alia, pro-competition and anti-business), as
follows:
...No doubt in some circumstances increased competition hurts enterprise; while in others it has an opposite effect. Short of a careful economic
analysis of each individual situation, how can one say whether a partililar order supnorts or opposes business? Indeed, what business Is
referred to as being supported or opposed? The applicant's business?
That of the rival carriers? The affected shipper's business? The transportation business? Or business in general? 92
Mendelson seems to suggest that classification of a judge's decision
as pro- or anti-business is impossible. If that is true for a particular
case (as it might be for a case in which the two parties are similar
business concerns and the court is asked to decide between conflicting
business interests), the case should be omitted from the scale, as
irrelevant to the value under investigation. The relationship between
judicial votes and attitude toward business is worthy of investigation
only if the court has made a significant number of decisions which
may be classified as being in favour of or opposed to business.
If a scale contains many cases for which classification in terms
of the value under investigation is doubtful, the descriptive value of
the scale is reduced. Conclusions based on such a scale must be
assessed accordingly.9 3
The discussion of some of the difficulties which may arise in the
classification of votes suggests that the behaviouralists over-state
their case when they claim that their focusing on votes rather than
opinions makes possible an objective treatment of the cases. Meaningful classification involves decisions which are subjective and about
which there may be disagreement. In difficult cases, the researcher
should explain the basis of the classification (much as accountants
use footnotes to explain some of their figures), so that the reader
may assess the validity of the scalogram description of the voting
behaviour. The more contentious the classification of cases, the less
confidence may be placed in the scalogram description.
A further difficulty in the use of the scalogram as a descriptive
device, arises from the fact that it may be possible to relate a voting
pattern to two or more policies which are put in issue simultaneously
in such a way that any vote affects both of the policies in fixed ways.
For example, a scale of civil liberty cases may be taken to show
92 Jurimetrics,supra,footnote 88, at 916.
93 See also Fuller, L. L., An Afterword: Science and the JudicialProcess,
(1966) 79 HARv. L. REv. 1604, at 1612-13. He refers to a study conducted by
Schubert in which cases were classified by a panel of three judges, who first
classified each case independently, and then discussed any disagreement in
classification until agreement was reached. See Schubert, G. A., Jackson's
Judicial Philosophy: An Exploration in Value Analysis, (1965) 59 Am. POL.
Sci. Rnv. 940, at 942. Fuller comments:
"The important issue lies, however, not in the utility of precautions
that can reduce the risk of misinterpretation, but in the difficulties inherent in the scoring task itself."
Surely the difficulties are not different in kind from the difficulties involved in formulating other judgments. Is it reasonable to ask for anything
more than "precautions that can reduce the risk of misinterpretation"?
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what effect the judges' votes have on civil liberty claims, or what
effect they have on the validity of challenged governmental measures
in cases where the law is not clear. A vote which upholds the civil
liberty claim always invalidates the legislation; a vote which rejects
the civil liberty claim always upholds the legislation. Thus, the voting
pattern may be related to the value of political liberalism or the
value of judicial restraint.9 4 Each relationship may be equally
plausible. This is perhaps a special form of the multi-issue case.
Where the voting patterns described on the scalogram may be
taken to show the relationship between the judges' votes and each of
two or more policies, the researcher must choose which relationship
he will investigate. He will, of course, choose to investigate those
95
policy issues which he considers "reasonable and non-trivial", and
which appear to afford a fruitful basis for explanation, considering the
subject matter of the cases, the legal principles and policies involved
and the reasons for judgment. Any assessment of the validity of his
explanation, must bear in mind that it is based on judicial voting
behaviour which may be described in different ways.
The Application of Scalogram Analysis to the
Supreme Court of Canada
Canadian lawyers will enquire whether scalogram analysis may
usefully be applied to the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada.
Researchers who attempt to do so will encounter one preliminary
difficulty of a technical nature. As many cases are decided by courts
composed of fewer than nine judges, a scalogram will contain many
blank spaces representing non-participation. Accordingly, the descriptive value of the scalogram will be less than it is for the Supreme
Court of the United States, where, generally speaking, the entire court
hears every case.9 6 It will not be possible to assess the extent of
this difficulty until an attempt is made to apply scalogram analysis
to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Supreme Court of Canada, of course, hears private as well
as public law cases. As far as I know, American researchers have
applied scalogram analysis only to public law decisions. However, it
will be of interest to attempt to examine, through the application of
scalogram analysis to Supreme Court decisions, whether any relationship exists between judicial voting behaviour and the values raised
in private law cases. Do the decisions of some judges in contract and
94 See Mendelson, Neo-BehavioraZ Approach, supra, footnote 82a, at 596-7;
Becker, Inquiry, supra, footnote 81; Tanenhaus, supra, footnote 35, at 1588-9.
Mendelson, Becker and Tanenhaus argue that even if scalability indicates
that the decisions are based on a single attitude, it is imposisble to identify
with certainty the nature of the attitude, and therefore it is impossible to say
on what attitude the decisions are based.
Ulmer agrees that scalogram analysis (as he conceives it) does not
identify the relevant attitude. The Analysis of Behavior Patterns in

the

United States Supreme Court, supra, footnote 52, at 647 and 648. SCHUBERT,
QUANTITATIVE AxiALysis oF JuDcIAL BEHAVIOR, supra, footnote 9, at 280.
95 Supra, footnote 26.

96 SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIs, supra, footnote 9 at 278; CONSTITUTIONAL POLTICS, (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 1960), 652-654.
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commercial law cases tend, more than those of others, to promote
commercial convenience or freedom of contract? Do the decisions of
some judges in tort cases tend, more than those of others, to promote
the wide distribution of the losses inherent in modern society, without
regard to fault? Unlike the Supreme Court of the United States, the
Supreme Court of Canada hears cases involving substantive criminal
law. Will the scalogram analysis describe interesting relationships
between judicial voting behaviour and different types of offences?
If, as a result of the positivist tradition in Canadian jurisprudence,
reasons for judgment in Supreme Court decisions are written in the
"formal style", rather than the "grand style", 97 scalogram analysis
may prove to be an important research technique in Canada. As
judgments written in the "formal style" tend to discuss precedent and
rules of law rather than policy, it is difficult to discover, from a
reading of those judgments, what values the Court seeks to foster.
Therefore, scalogram descriptions of the effect of judicial voting
would appear to be a helpful complement to traditional approaches
to such judgments.
Finally, the application of scalograms to decisions of the Supreme
Court of Canada might be found to be particularly useful, because
there appears to be little knowledge in this country about judicial
attitudes and value preferences. Quite apart from the work of the
judicial behaviouralists, American lawyers and legal scholars have for
many years been aware of the judicial propensities of individual
members of the United States Supreme Court. Indeed, one of Mendelson's criticisms of the work of the behaviouralists is that many of
their conclusions are not new, but only confirm what students of
the court already know. 98 In Canada, however, a description of the
relationship between judicial voting and the values raised by the
cases will add significantly to an understanding of judicial behaviour.

97 For this distinction, see LLEWELLYN, K., THE COMMON LAW TRADITImN
-DECIDING APPEALS, (1960).
98 Mendelson, W., Neo-Behavioral Approach, supra, footnote 82a, at 602.

